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  Using the Thai experience as a clinical study of a financial crisis, we 
investigate financial failures of Thai financial institutions. This study augments the 
CAMEL perspective by considering corporate governance and the moral hazard 
problems under the state of implicit government guarantee. The overall results suggest 
that high-replicated CAMEL ratings and downgrades of the ratings based on 
accounting-based information are likely to be important indicators of bank fragility. The 
ownership-based incentives of the largest shareholders and the level of risk associated 
with moral hazard problems are also factors that help discriminate sound and unsound 
financial institutions. 
Keywords:  CAMEL rating, incentives, deposit insurance, financial failure, Thai 
financial institutions 




 1.  Introduction 
After the onset of the 1997 financial crisis in the East Asian countries, many 
attempts by scholars and policymakers have been taken to identify key macro-economic 
indicators such as real interest rates, economic growth, inflation, capital and current 
accounts, international reserves, M2, debt profiles and the like that may be used to 
predict possible crisis has been revived.
1 Looking from micro perspectives, many 
studies in this area have been done to predict bank failure using accounting-based 
CAMEL components. This study focuses on micro-based factors by augmenting 
CAMEL perspective to account for corporate governance mechanisms and 
market-based risk. 
 Taking Thailand as a laboratory experiment of a financial crisis, we 
investigate factors that may help to explain the failures of financial institutions. With its 
unique characteristics of having highly ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholders and implicit government subsidy, this research attempts to analyze the 
importance of four major factors, which include accounting-based CAMEL ratings, the 
downgrading of CAMEL ratings, incentives, and the risk associated with implicit 
guarantee. 
The paper close to our study is Bongini et al. (2001, 2002). However, their 
studies are based on the international cross-section data. Although they control for 
country effect on the distress and closure of financial institutions, the analysis is not 
sufficient to draw conclusion about the effects of governance mechanisms since 
countries differ in terms of legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, taxation 
                                                  
1  For more details, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Kaminsky et al. (1998). schemes, and accounting practices. Moreover, we employ alternate ways of replicating 
CAMEL scores and emphasize more on the downgrade of CAMEL ratings. 
The overall results show that CAMEL ratings constructed based on the 
financial information of financial institutions have a significant influence on the 
likelihood of financial failures. The paper provides additional evidence to the literature 
by presenting that financial institutions in which the CAMEL rated scores are 
downgraded into the critical score zone of 3-5 are more likely to experience financial 
failures. Using market-based measure of contingent liability to be borne by the 
government, we find that the larger the cost associated with implicit government 
guarantee, the higher the institutions are likely to suffer from financial failures. 
After controlling for institutional size, our findings further show that the 
institutions where the incentives of the largest shareholders are aligned with those of 
other shareholders are more likely to survive the crisis. However, when the shareholders 
from family business group are involved in the board of directors’ decision, this 
increases the likelihood of the problem.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an 
overview of Thai financial market. Section 3 discusses theoretical issues and hypotheses 
regarding the information content of accounting-based information, the risk associated 
with implicit government guarantee, and incentives. We describe data sources, 
methodologies and measurements in Section 4. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics 
and regression results. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Overview of Thai financial market and challenges to its sustainability 
    To study determinants that explain the causes of Thai banking crises, we first 
investigate the background of its financial system. The history of Thai financial market development went back to 1888 when the British-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank set up its first branch to facilitate foreign trade financing. Foreign banks had 
enormous influence on banking business in Thai financial market during its early stage 
of development. Realizing the economic importance of having independent financial 
system, the first domestic commercial bank was established in 1904 under the name of 
Book Club, presently known as the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB). 
Thai commercial banking business has expanded over time with the 
establishment of 14 more domestic banks during 1930s and 1960s, of which 12 banks 
were founded by family groups, many of which had remained control over the banks’ 
daily operations until before the crisis. Ownership had been highly concentrated in the 
hands of the largest individual shareholders even though the laws put the upper limits of 
shareholdings to be at 5 percent and 10 percent for banks and finance companies 
respectively (Anuchitworawong et al., 2003). 
Thai banks have long enjoyed a high degree of protection against foreign bank 
competition. Until 1996, there were 25% foreign shareholding limit and a moratorium 
on the granting of new banking licenses by the central Bank of Thailand (BOT).
2 These 
protections may lead to lack in skills and progress of institutional development, which 
later drive crisis. Furthermore, such market access limitation gives rise to the increasing 
                                                  
2  After the crisis in 1997, the BOT allowed more participation from foreign banks by allowing 
foreign investors to hold more than 49% of the shares in financial institutions for up to 10 years, 
after which they will be grandfathered with respect to their existing ownership. Recently, a draft 
Financial Master Plan plans to allow foreign banks already in the country to apply for more 
full-branch licenses (The Nation: December 27, 2003). roles of finance companies that are subject to less stringent prudential requirements than 
banks.
3 However, finance companies that are young relative to banks have been left to 
engage in more risky behaviors. Some finance companies were independent while many 
institutions were subsidiaries or affiliates of family-controlled banks. 
Thailand’s banking industry has been concentrated and characterized by an 
oligopolistic market structure. Bangkok Bank, the largest bank in the market, had a 
market share of 28 and 21 percent at the end of 1988 and 2001 respectively. The bulk of 
the commercial banking system assets was accounted for by five banks – privately 
owned Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, Siam Commercial Bank 
and government-owned Krung Thai Bank. Their combined market share amounted to 
more than 60 and 59 percent in 1988 and 2001 respectively.   
Financial institutions – commercial banks in particular – are the central players 
in Thai financial system. The ratio of total bank assets to GDP has been more than 100 
percent throughout the period of 1993-2001, while that of other financial institutions has 
never been higher than 40 percent. Banks also play important role in absorbing more 
than 75 percent of total deposits during 1993-2001 while finance companies absorb less 
than 32 percent before the crisis, and less than 10 percent after the 1997 financial crisis. 
    In retrospect, Thai financial system had ever experienced three important crises 
from the collapses of: 1) large finance firm called Raja Finance in 1979 due to the use 
of substantial amount of money in manipulating its share price, 2) a number of finance 
                                                  
3 Unlike banks, finance companies are not allowed to take direct deposits from the public, but 
can fund operations primarily through the issuance of large-denomination promissory notes, or 
through credits from banks and other financial institutions companies in 1983 due to fraud and mismanagement, and 3) 56 troubled finance 
companies and the bath devaluation in 1997. One of the reasons that could help explain 
such phenomena is the lack of sufficient supervisory structure on financial institutions, 
especially for the 1997 financial crisis in which the effect of weak corporate governance 
in both financial and corporate sectors has often been debated.   
    To rehabilitate troubled institutions and restore solvency and financial stability, 
the Bank of Thailand set up the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) in 
1985. In fact, Thailand has no formal explicit deposit insurance scheme, but the FIDF 
may be considered as providing implicit guarantee and financial assistance to depositors 
and creditors of financial institutions. During the financial crisis in 1997, the FIDF had 
to resort to a blanket guarantee to restore public confidence and played an important 
role in reimbursing the depositors of 56 closed finance companies by exchanging 
promissory notes of these institutions with three- to five-year notes of government 
owned financial institutions. Note that the depositors of failed institutions were 
reimbursed a portion of their deposits long before the establishment of the FIDF.   
    In the early 1990s, the Thai authorities liberalized financial system in various 
dimensions including mainly: 1) liberal foreign exchange controls, 2) the development 
of offshore banking facilities, and 3) the removal of interest rate ceilings on deposits 
and loans. However, the authorities stopped short of liberalizing exchange rate scheme 
that should correspond to the changing nature of capital inflows and outflows. Even 
worse, there was a failure to prudently supervise financial institutions by the authorities 
and to ensure prudent lending and borrowing policies of the institutions. These factors 
can largely be attributed to the causes of financial collapse in mid-1997. Attempting to 
resolve the causes of the problems, the Thai authorities have adopted financial reform measures relating to structural, legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework to strength 
financial and economic structures.   
3. Theoretical background 
3.1 Information content of financial data 
There is by now a vast literature attempting to address the causes of the 
financial crises from a macro perspective. Researchers argue that many crises are 
macro-induced or externally driven (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; to 
name a few). Macroeconomic variables that help explain the phenomena are, for 
example, slow GDP growth, high domestic credit growth, high inflation, and high world 
and domestic interest rates. However, these macro-related causes fail to pinpoint causes 
of problems at the micro-related level. 
To account for micro-related causes, many studies have focused on internal 
factors especially relating with financial conditions of financial institutions in 
understanding the soundness of the institutions. Most studies find that CAMEL (an 
acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity) 
ratings are generally reflecting the soundness of financial institutions. For instance, 
based on event study methodology, Berger and Davies (1998) find that the downgrading 
of CAMEL ratings reveals unfavorable information about the financial health of banks 
to the stock market. Similarly, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that supervisory ratings 
contain information that market participants do not have. 
Bongini et al. (2001) investigate the determinants of financial distress during 
the East Asian crisis by employing the sample of 283 financial institutions from the East 
Asian countries – Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Phillipines, and Thailand. Similarly, Persons (1999) focuses on the financial fragility of Thai finance companies. Both 
studies present that CAMEL-type financial data helps predict the failure of financial 
institutions. However, their study may be prone to high correlation among financial data. 
Later, Bongini et al. (2002) improves the method by using composite indicator in the 
analysis of their international cross-section data. They provide support to the power of 
ex-post CAMEL rating indicator in discriminating strong and weak banks. Thus we 
expect: 
H1: Financial institutions with poor CAMEL composite rating are more likely to fail. 
Recent research suggests the use of information about the condition of financial 
institutions derived from financial statements in predicting which institutions would 
have their supervisory ratings downgraded to unfavorable status (Gilbert et al., 2000). 
Since the literature suggests that CAMEL ratings do contain information of financial 
soundness of financial institutions useful to both the supervisory and public monitoring, 
the downgrade or upgrade of the ratings may also provide information to differentiate 
sound financial institutions from problem institutions. 
H2: Financial institutions that have worse CAMEL composite ratings compared to 
those in the recent years are more likely to fail. 
3.2 Insurer’s contingent liability 
Deposit insurance has different regulations across countries, ranging from full 
to partial coverage and from explicit to implicit scheme. All have costs and benefits. 
Full coverage scheme helps eliminate bank run to preserve the stability of all financial 
institutions. However, such a scheme can create moral hazard problem that tempts these 
institutions to make unreasonable commitments, and at the same time makes depositors less careful, and discourage them from moving their funds to safer institutions. As a 
result, a poorly designed scheme may encourage risky behavior by both depositors and 
institutions, and this will not improve the stability of financial system.   
The literature concerning the bank fundamentals suggests that lack of 
monitoring and discipline resulting from full implicit deposit insurance guarantees is at 
the center of banking crises that culminate in currency crises. Eichengreen and Portes 
(1997), Dooley (1997), Krugman (1998), Corsetti, et al. (1998), Glick (1998), Mishkin 
(1999), and Chinn and Kletzer (2000) to name a few, assume that the Thai government 
(and other East Asian governments) provided full implicit deposit guarantees to the 
depositors of private financial institutions, which along with weak supervision and 
regulation led to lack of discipline, resulting in moral hazard behavior at these 
institutions. This behavior led to over-investment (especially in real estate), producing a 
boom/bust asset price cycle that brought down these Asian economies. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that explicit deposit insurance 
system weakens market discipline on banks by their creditors. Garcia (1999) further 
argue that poorly designed deposit insurance scheme will cause agency problem in 
which bank managers or employees acting as an agent of shareholders pursue their own 
interests rather than those of the shareholders. In addition, the bank owners and 
managers of the insured institutions, realizing that runs are unlikely, may take on 
additional risk in their asset portfolios   
  Subsequent to the development of option-pricing framework of Black and 
Scholes (1973), Merton (1977) was the first to model deposit insurance as a put option 
on bank assets. Marcus and Shaked (1984) examine the overpricing of deposit insurance 
by looking at the pre-insurance value of bank assets and find evidence of substantial overpricing of insurance premiums. Ronn and Verma (1986) account for regulatory 
capital forbearance in their pricing model, and the post-insurance value of assets, 
allowing for the dependence of the value of guarantee on the future value of assets. 
  Later, Duan (1994) develops a maximum likelihood framework to estimate the 
value of deposit insurance. However, implementing the Duan method requires accurate 
and high frequency data on deposits. Duan and Yu (1994) apply the method of Duan 
(1994) to calculate insurance premiums for Taiwanese depository institutions. They find 
that these institutions were heavily subsidized by the deposit-insuring agency.   
  Using the sample of 15 Thai banks, Kaplan (2002) uses the method of Duan 
(1994) to estimate government subsidies. The author argues that the estimated value of 
government subsidy can serve as an early warning indicator of banking crisis in Thai 
financial system. Applying the barrier model of Boyle and Lee (1994) to measure 
deposit insurance premiums of Thai banks and finance firms during 1992-1996, Tirapat 
(2002) finds similar evidence that higher risk institutions have higher insurance 
premiums. Based on these arguments, we expect that: 
H3: Financial institutions that have substantial costs of implicit government guarantee 
are more likely to fail. 
3.3 Incentives and internal corporate control 
Much of the focus in the governance literature is how managerial discretion can 
be brought under effective control through ownership and internal control (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988). The costs and 
benefits of having large shareholders are at least theoretically clear. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) argue that large shareholders are not well diversified and have to bear excess risks due to wealth vested in firms.   
Recent studies provide convincing evidence that, especially in the countries 
with weak minority protection, when there is a high degree of deviation of cash flow 
rights from control rights of large or controlling shareholders, this will have significant 
negative effect on firm performance (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002). To 
the extent that control mechanisms lead to deviations from one-share-one-vote rule, the 
controlling shareholders will have control and opportunity to pursue for private interests 
incompatible with other shareholders’ interests. From these arguments, higher cash flow 
rights may benefit atomistic shareholders, by increasing monitoring of management and 
by raising the cost of the largest shareholder of diverting profits from a firm 
Furthermore, a number of studies examine the relationship between bank risk 
and ownership. Their findings have varied considerably. Some argue that the 
relationship between insider ownership and the risk of banks is sometimes positive, 
some times negative, sometimes U-shaped, and some times inverted U-shaped 
(Demsetz et al., 1997; Brewer and Saidenberg, 1996) 
  As banking crises have shown not only that banks often take excessive risks 
but also that risk taking differs across banks. Some banks engage in more risks while 
others institutions are more prudent and would be able to alleviate tremendous effects of 
a crisis. By incorporating the view that ownership is an incentive-inducing mechanism, 
we expect that, in general 
H4: Financial institutions where the largest shareholders have more incentives 
corresponding to their large ownership in financial institutions are less likely to fail.   
 4. Data and measurements 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
The sample includes 52 Thai financial institutions – institutions quoted in 1996 
in the banking section and in the finance and securities section of the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) with complete available information, except securities and leasing firms 
– used in investigating determinants that explain subsequent closure or intervention by 
the government after the 1997 financial crisis. Information about the closure is collected 
from news, articles, magazines, and announcements from state authorities. 
We primarily use annual reports of financial institutions and I-SIMS database 
developed by the SET to collect bank specific information, daily market capitalization, 
relevant accounting items from financial statements, and equity ownership of 
shareholders who hold more than 0.5 percent of total outstanding shares.   
Further, this study is based on a unique ownership database and different 
sources of information about family relationship. The sources include Phipatseritham 
(1981), Phipatseritham and Yoshihara (1983), Suehiro (1989), Chulpongsatorn (2000), 
and Sapphaibun (2001a and 2001b). Importantly, the information on all registered firms 
used in tracing ownership of private firms at the layers of control chains is obtained 
from the on-line database service of Business Online (BOL) that has been granted the 
right by the Ministry of Commerce. Using this information allows us to trace for 
ultimate ownership and control of each financial institution.   
4.2 Failure of financial institutions 
  To investigate the relationship between governance quality, informativeness of 
accounting information and contingent liabilities and the likelihood of bank failure 
using logit regression analysis, we account for three definitions of bank failure – mandatory closure, suspension, and distress. Following Bongini et al. (2001), this study 
treats the distress of financial institutions and closure separately. Additionally, we 
separately analyze the case of suspension. Mandatory closure refers to the case when a 
financial institution was ordered to close by the authority during 1997-1999. Suspension 
is assigned to a financial institution whose operations were suspended by the order of 
the Ministry of Finance in the crisis year of 1997. Distress includes all institutions that 
were recapitalized with capital support from the government authority, compulsorily 
closed by the laws, or suspended during 1997-1999. In logit regression models, the 
dependent variable is a binary variable, coded separately according to the definitions of 
bank failures. For example, under the definition of suspension, the dependent variable 
takes a value one if a financial institution was suspended from operations in 1997 by the 
order of the authority.   
  Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the sample banks and finance 
companies based on the definitions given above. The sample consists of 16 banks which 
include one government-owned specialized institution and 36 finance companies. 
Panels A and C show that nearly 53.85 percent and 59.62 percent of all sample 
institutions were compulsorily closed by the government authority and were in distress 
conditions respectively. Panel B for the case of suspension reveals that about 38.46 
percent of all firms were suspended from operations. Overall, finance companies were 
the largest group of firms that experienced failures during 1997-1999.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 4.3 Contingent liability 
    This section describes the method for estimating the magnitude of contingent 
liability or deposit insurance premiums for financial institutions. This paper follows 
Ronn and Verma (1986) in calculating deposit insurance premiums that was modeled by 
Merton (1977), based on the Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing framework. The 
concept is to interpret deposit insurance as a put option on the value of bank assets.   
    To apply option-pricing model to a financial institution, several assumptions 
are made. First, it is assumed that the bank’s debts are equal to its deposits, D, and that 
all deposits including their interest are insured. Next, it is assumed that the time, T, until 
the maturity of the deposits is equal to the time until the next annual audit of the bank. 
In our context, we assume T to be one year. This is reasonable since the Bank of 
Thailand makes an on-site inspection annually. Lastly, it is assumed that the bank’s asset 
values follow geometric Brownian motion with drift  µ  and  volatility σ : 
   t t dW dt V d σ µ + = ln  (1) 
where V is the value of assets, W indicates a standard Wiener process. 
  Given the above assumptions, the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing 
model is used to value the price of deposit insurance per unit of deposits, p, which can 
be written as follows: 
  ) ( ) / ) 1 (( ) ( t t t y D V y T p − Φ − − − Φ = δ σ  (2) 
where  ) /( )) )( 2 / ( ] / ) 1 [( (ln 2 T T D V y t t σ σ δ + − = ,  Φ  is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function, and  δ   is the dividend per dollar of the value of assets. 
    To implement the model, we follow Ronn and Verma (1986) in estimating two 
unobservable variables in equation (2), i.e. the bank’s asset value, V, and its volatility, σ . We view the equity value of bank, E, which is directly observable, as a fully 
dividend-protected call option on the bank’s assets with a strike price equal to the value 
of its debt as follows. 
  ) ( ) ( T h D h V E t t t t σ − Φ − Φ =  (3) 
where  ) /( )) )( 2 / ( ] / [ (ln 2 T T D V h t t σ σ + = .  σ  can be solved by applying Ito’s 
Lemma to equation (3). 
 







σ  (4) 
where  E σ   is the annualized standard deviation of equity returns. 
  With observable market capitalization and equity volatility, we simultaneously 
estimate these two non-linear equations to obtain V and σ , which will be used in 
deriving deposit insurance premiums in equation (2). Note that we acknowledge the 
deficiency of imposing constant equity volatility. Nevertheless, to implicit the Duan’s 
method where estimates are consistent, we need audited high-frequency data on deposits 
that is not generally available. 
4.4 CAMEL  components 
Accounting information has long been used to detect financial and managerial 
risk of firms. Many scholars have focused on such information as an early warning 
system that helps discriminate between financially troubled firms and viable firms. The 
majority of prior research that attempts to predict bank failure focuses on capturing 
informativeness of CAMEL components. However, there is no a precise choice of 
financial variable that corresponds to each CAMEL component.   
Bongini et al. (2001) employ a set of traditional, CAMEL-type variables which are equity to gross loans, loans to borrowings, operational expenses to revenues, loan 
loss reserves to capital, loan growth, net interest income to total income, and return on 
assets. Only the last four variables were found to predict subsequent distress and closure 
relatively well. However, for our sample, we find that this set of variables tends to be 
highly correlated and would cause multicollinearity in regressions, which will makes 
results hard to interpret. Thus, we decide to use alternate proxies instead as follows: 
a)  Capital adequacy 
This study utilizes the equity ratio, defined as the ratio of total shareholders’ 
equity to total assets, to serve as a proxy for capital adequacy. Generally, we expect the 
ratio to be negatively associated with the probability of failure because a higher portion 
of equity represents a cushion to absorb future losses.   
b)  Asset quality 
Previous research often uses non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio that is 
associated with credit risk. However, information about NPLs of each institution in 
1996 is not publicly available. Therefore, we use the ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
assets as an indicator of asset quality. Because a higher level of this ratio reflects 
deterioration in asset quality, we expect that it will result in higher probability of failure. 
c)  Management 
The variable used to proxy for management quality is the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to non-interest income, which may reflect the competence of the management 
in controlling costs. We are concerned for operating efficiency of an institution. Better 
ability to control operating costs is indicated by a smaller value of this ratio. It is 
expected that higher operating efficiency should reduce the likelihood of failure. 
d)  Earnings Earnings are measured with the ratio of earnings before tax to total 
shareholders’ equity. This profitability ratio indicates how well an institution is managed 
to earn a high return for shareholders. Therefore, we expect that higher profitability 
ratio will reduce the likelihood of institutional failure. 
e)  Liquidity 
A ratio of cash to total assets is included into the model as a representative of 
liquidity in the assessment of failure. An adequate level of liquidity will help an 
institution to meet financial commitments and unexpected withdrawals. In this sense, 
we expect that financial institutions with more liquidity are likely to encounter lower 
probability of distress or failure. 
4.5  CAMEL composite indicator 
We further attempt to construct a single composite indicator that would help 
reduce the number of explanatory variables and the problem associated with highly 
correlated variables in regression models. In this study, we apply two methods in 
constructing a CAMEL composite indicator. 
4.5.1 Weighted average 
Using this method, we first compute a percentile ranking for each of CAMEL 
components – equity ratio, loan loss provision ratio, cash ratio, the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to non-interest income, and return on equity. Next, the percentile rankings for 
all components are then equally weighted. Hence we assume that all CAMEL 
components are equally important. Note that we need to transform loan loss provision 
ratio and the ratio of non-interest expenses to non-interest income by using their 
reciprocals before ranking. We then add the weighted percentile scores together to 
obtain total weighted percentiles for an institution, which are used in assigning a score.   This study uses 5-score scale in replicating the bank regulator’s CAMEL rating 
scheme. Specifically, the composite CAMEL indicators (CAMELEQWEIGHTED) are 
assigned on a scale of 1 to 5, with a score of 1 for 90-100 percentile range, 2 for 70-90 
percentile range, 3 for 50-70 percentile range, 4 for 30-50 percentile range, and 5 for 
0-30 percentile range. Financial institutions with score 5 represent the set of institutions 
with the most severe problems that need immediate supervisory concern. 
4.5.2 Dichotomizing 
The second method follows a similar approach by Bongini et al. (2002). The 
composite indicator is constructed by dichotomizing each of CAMEL components by 
assigning the value one to the component that has a percentile ranking below a 
threshold. This paper uses a stricter threshold of 50% level rather than 25% as in 
Bongini et al. (2002). Then we sum the assigned values across all components to derive 
composite indicator CAMELDICHOTOMIZED. Hence, an indicator for an institution 
can take any of the values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. An institution with higher value of this 
indicator is expected to bear higher risk. 
4.6 Governance variables 
We employ three measures to capture their effects on the viability of financial 
institutions from corporate governance perspective. They include ownership 
concentration, board linkage between family business groups and financial institutions, 
and board independence. 
For ownership concentration, we use cash flow rights held by the largest 
shareholders that represent their incentives in monitoring and controlling financial 
institutions. Cash flow rights (CFRIGHT) are the percentage of ownership rights held 
by a controlling shareholder, collected as of December or the closest date and computed based on Claessens et al (2000), and Anuchitworawong et al. (2003) for Thai financial 
institutions in particular. In addition, the shareholdings of individuals related through 
blood or marriage are aggregated and reported as a single unit.   
    Connection used to capture the potential for moral hazard is represented by 
board linkage between family business group and financial institution (FAMINBD). The 
FAMINBD  dummy variable takes the value one if the largest shareholder from family 
group is on the board of directors and zero otherwise. 
    To capture the effectiveness of the board of directors, we construct a 
DUALITY variable to take the value one if a chief executive officer (CEO) chairs the 
board of directors. A person who holds both positions tends to have a significant power 
to control a firm and makes it difficult for the board to effectively monitor the firm, thus 
this is considered an agency problem. 
    In addition, we control for the size of financial institution (FIRM SIZE), which 
is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Firm size is used to 
examine if the implicit “too big to fail” protection induces lower probability of failure, 
as suggested in the literature. Table 2 gives summary definitions of all variables used in 
this study. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
5.  Results 
5.1  Descriptive statistics 
The following sub-sections provide descriptive analysis on accounting 
information that is used to proxy for CAMEL components, CAMEL ratings, contingent liabilities due to implicit guarantee scheme, and ownership-based incentives. The 
analysis is presented by categorizing firms based on the definitions of bank failures. 
5.1.1  CAMEL components and ratings 
Accounting information used as a proxy for Camel components in this study 
includes equity ratio, loan loss provision ratio, cash ratio, the ratio of non-interest 
expenses to non-interest income, and return on equity. In Table 3, Panel A shows that, 
irrespective of the definitions of bank failure, problem firms that include closed, 
suspended and distressed financial institutions experienced unsatisfactory financial 
performance, when compared with non-problem firms. For example, distressed financial 
institutions had lower level of capital adequacy measured by equity ratio and lower 
asset quality shown by higher loan loss provision ratio. However, their mean and 
median differences are not statistically significant.   
Interestingly, problem institutions tend to have liquidity problems and inefficient 
management quality. For instance, among three types of bank failures, the institutions 
that were suspended and not reopened are the group of firms that had the lowest average 
cash ratio, especially in 1996 only at 1.25%. In addition, problem institutions tend to 
experience a high ratio of non-interest expenses to interest income in 1996, the year 
prior to the crisis. In addition, non-problems institutions generated higher return on 
equity. Using Wilcoxon rank-sum test of differences between relevant partitioned 
groups, we find that median differences on cash ratio, the ratio of non-interest expenses 
to interest income and return on equity for each type of bank failures are statistically 
significant at conventional level. 
 ------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
In Table 4, we transform the CAMEL components in Table 3 into a composite 
indicator. Low CAMEL rating indicates the soundness of an institution. From the results 
over the periods 1994-1996, we find stronger support to previous paragraph that 
problem firms were riskier and needed closer supervision from the central bank 
supervisor. The differences in mean and median between related partitioned groups 
under each type of failures are significant at the 5 percent level or better almost in every 
category. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
5.1.2  Contingent liability 
Table 5 presents that, irrespective of whether problem financial institutions are 
defined under mandatory closure, suspension or distress, the costs of implicit 
government guarantee in problem institutions on average are relatively much higher 
than those in non-problem institutions. For instance, the mean (median) value of the 
government’s contingent liability is approximately 5.01 (3.48) basis points in suspended 
institutions, compared with only 2.21 (1.09) basis points in non-suspended institutions. 
Their differences are also highly significant. Our results provide support to Tirapat 
(2002), Kaplan (2002) and Anuchitworawong (2003) who use the sample of Thai 
financial institutions to investigate deposit insurance premiums and find similar 
conclusion that weak institutions tend to generate high cost of deposit insurance. ------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
5.1.3  Ownership and internal corporate control 
Table 6 first investigates the incentives of the largest shareholders in monitoring 
the firms’ operations by looking into their cash flow rights. We find that the largest 
shareholders in non-problem institutions held larger cash flow rights relative to those of 
problem firms. Similarly, their voting rights on average are relatively high in excess of 
the maximum level of 5 percent for banks and 10 percent for finance companies 
designated by laws.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 7 reveals that not less than 80 (60) percent of all firms have the largest 
shareholders hold control rights (cash flow rights) in the range between 10-50%. 
Furthermore, voting rights are highly concentrated in the hands of a family or a group of 
related families, seconded by the government authority. Having members from a family 
or a group of related families as the largest shareholders, they would assign any of their 
family members to serve on the board of directors. Table 6 suggests that problem 
institutions often have the largest shareholders from a family hold board positions.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
 5.2  Empirical results 
Logit regression models are employed to identify whether the determinants like 
governance variables, contingent liabilities and CAMEL-based measures have power in 
predicting the failures of Thai financial institutions. Table 8 groups regression results 
based on the definitions of failures – mandatory closure, suspension, and distress. The 
overall results tend to provide similar conclusions by suggesting the informativeness of 
CAMEL ratings, governance variables, and stock market based information in 
explaining financial institutional failures 
Irrespective of the types of failures, the results show that there is an increased 
likelihood of becoming problem financial institutions in which they experience high 
CAMEL ratings, meaning that the institutions are poorly rated. The result provides 
support to Hypothesis 1. The specifications with CAMELEQWEIGHTED and 
CAMELDICHOTOMIZED have fairly high predictive power over other model 
specifications, as indicated by their concordant ratios in excess of 78 percent together 
with relatively high pseudo R-squared ranging in between 37.36 percent and 52.39 
percent. Apparently, the specification (7) shows better predictive power with the highest 
pseudo R-squared at 52.39 percent and the highest concordant ratio of 84.62 percent 
while it shares quite low Type I error at only 15 percent.
4 
In addition, the positive coefficients of CAMEL ratings downgraded into the 
score zone of 3-5 points (DGRADECAMELEQ and DGRADECAMELDICHO) 
support Hypothesis 2, which indicates that financial institutions with poor CAMEL 
                                                  
4  For robustness check, we use CAMEL ratings averaged over the periods 1994-1996. However, 
the results are not changed qualitatively. ratings compared with those in the recent years are more likely to fail. The models’ 
overall predictive power is relatively high for the set of mandatory closure. Their 
concordant ratio is about 80-82.69 percent while there is quite small percentage of Type 
I error. 
Regarding the risks based on estimated contingent liability, the results show that 
financial institutions with higher costs of implicit deposit insurance tend to experience 
financial problems. The contingent liability variable, however, does not enter the 
regression significantly in every specification. Therefore, the results are unable to 
strongly support Hypothesis 3. 
Based on the results in all regressions, we find strong evidence that financial 
institutions in which the largest shareholders from family business groups are present on 
the board of directors are more likely to be fragile. The coefficient of FAMINBD  is 
highly significant at the 5 percent level or better in all regression specifications. This 
may suggest that when a family business group has an influence over the board of 
directors’ decision in a financial institution, it is more likely that the institution will 
experience financial problems. 
However, it is found that when the largest controlling shareholders hold 
substantial cash flow rights in an institution, there is an increased likelihood that this 
financial institution will survive, weakly consistent with Hypothesis 4. The results 
suggest that the controlling shareholders may be reluctant to pursue their own private 
benefits when they have large stakes in the institutions.   
6.  Conclusion 
This study provides a strong support to the importance of accounting-based 
information and to a certain extent the use of market-based deposit insurance premium and ownership-based incentives in explaining the financial fragility of Thai financial 
institutions. Although we cannot draw the generalization of the research results because 
of the small sample size, the study raises an important issue of whether the CAMEL 
ratings measured based on the on-site/off-site examinations by the central bank 
supervisor should be disclosed in order to induce better public monitoring on the 
financial soundness of financial institutions. The study further introduces how much the 
incentives and the risk associated with the moral hazard problems under implicit 
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Banks (%)  
Finance
Companies
(%)   All (%)  
Panel A: Mandatory closure
Mandatorily closed (1997-1999) 4 7.69 24 46.15 28 53.85
Non-closed (1997-1999) 12 23.08 12 23.08 24 46.15
Panel B: Suspension
Suspended (1997) 0 0.00 20 38.46 20 38.46
Non-suspended (1997) 16 30.77 16 30.77 32 61.54
Panel C: Distress
Distressed (1997-1999) 7 13.46 24 46.15 31 59.62
Non-distressed (1997-1999) 9 17.31 12 23.08 21 40.38
No. of institutions in the sample 16 30.77 36 69.23 52 100.00
This table summarizes the distribution of sample banks and finance companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET) during 1996 according to the definitions of failures which are mandatory closure, suspension, and distress. The %
























Summary of variable definitions
Risk:
Contingent liability Cost of deposit insurance per unit of all bank debts using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986)
CAMEL Components:
Equity ratio The ratio of total shareholders' equity to total assets as a proxy for capital adequacy
Loan loss provision ratio The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets as a proxy for asset quality
NONINTEXP/NONINTINC The ratio of non-interest expenses to non-interest income as a proxy for management quality
Cash ratio The ratio of cash to total assets as a proxy for liquidity risk
Return on equity The ratio of earnings before tax and extra-ordinary items to total shareholders' equity as a proxy
for earning
CAMEL Rating:
CAMELEQWEIGHTED Score that is assigned to any of 5 ranges based on an equally weighted average of percentile scores 
of all CAMEL components (5 ranges: 0-30 with score 5, 30-50 with score 4, 50-70 with score 3,
70-90 with score 2, 90-100 with score 1)
CAMELDICHOTOMIZED Sum of the values assigned to five dummy variables that are transformed based on the percentile scores
of corresponding CAMEL components. Dummy variable takes value one if the percentile score of 
a CAMEL component is below 50%
DGRADECAMELEQ Dummy variable which takes the value one if CAMELEQWEIGHTED in 1996 has the score higher
than 2, compared with average CAMELEQWEIGHTED for the period 1994-1995
DGRADECAMELDICHO Dummy variable which takes the value one if CAMELDICHOTOMIZED in 1996 has the score higher
than 2, compared with average CAMELEQWEIGHTED for the period 1994-1995
Governance variables:
CFRIGHT The percentage of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder in 1996
(Cash flow rights are measured as of the last book closing date in 1996, which varies among
financial institutions and is not exactly at December 31)
FAMINBD Dummy variable which takes the value one if the largest shareholder from family group is on the board
of directors and zero otherwise
DUALITY Dummy variable which takes the value one if the chairman of the board also serves the chief executive
officer or the chairman of the executive board and zero otherwise
Other variable:
FIRM SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
All variables except ownership variables are measured as of December 31, 1996. Cash flow rights of the largest shareholders are













Descriptive statistics for CAMEL
Panel A: Mandatory closure
Non- Non- Non-
closed Closed closed Closed closed Closed
All [N=24] [N=27] [N=24] [N=28] [N=24] [N=28]
Equity ratio (%) 10.61 10.46 11.44 10.47 11.10 10.41 9.74
(9.90) (8.97) (10.68) (9.85) (11.48) (9.68) (9.86)
Loan loss provision ratio (%) 0.37 0.30 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.31 0.86
(0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.17) (0.31) (0.30)
Cash ratio (%) 2.37 4.00 1.66* 2.95 2.11** 2.44 1.46***
(1.67) (2.97) (1.34)*** (2.79) (1.62)* (2.20) (1.35)***
NONINTEXP/NONINTINC 1.92 1.35 1.25 1.71 1.25 1.98 4.87
(1.49) (1.27) (1.00) (1.59) (1.36) (1.86) (2.50)**
Return on equity (%) 17.43 29.02 24.09** 21.06 11.72*** 18.77 2.54**
(17.02) (28.49) (23.54)** (22.03) (12.57)*** (17.49) (9.12)***
Panel B: Suspension
Non- Non- Non-
suspended Suspended suspended Suspended suspended Suspended
All [N=32] [N=19] [N=32] [N=20] [N=32] [N=20]
Equity ratio (%) 10.61 10.77 11.33 10.62 11.11 10.31 9.63
(9.90) (9.40) (10.20) (10.41) (11.41) (9.82) (9.80)
Loan loss provision ratio (%) 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.18 0.71 0.43
(0.24) (0.31) (0.28) (0.22) (0.12) (0.32) (0.28)
Cash ratio (%) 2.37 3.56 1.38** 2.93 1.80*** 2.32 1.25***
(1.67) (2.89) (1.19)*** (2.79) (1.38)*** (2.03) (1.34)***
NONINTEXP/NONINTINC 1.92 1.44 1.05 1.77 1.43 2.26 5.58
(1.49) (1.27) (0.94) (1.55) (1.36) (1.92) (2.45)*
Return on equity (%) 17.43 27.27 24.96 18.95 11.36*** 11.03 8.44
(17.02) (26.28) (23.54) (19.09) (12.32)*** (16.07) (9.12)***
Panel C: Distress
Non- Non- Non-
distressed Distressed distressed Distressed distressed Distressed
All [N=21] [N=30] [N=21] [N=31] [N=21] [N=31]
Equity ratio (%) 10.61 10.91 11.03 10.95 10.71 10.86 9.50
(9.90) (9.63) (9.63) (10.96) (11.39) (9.90) (9.80)
Loan loss provision ratio (%) 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.19 0.22 0.30 0.81
(0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.21) (0.18) (0.30) (0.31)
Cash ratio (%) 2.37 4.13 1.80* 2.82 2.29 2.35 1.61**
(1.67) (2.52) (1.52)** (2.51) (1.67) (1.87) (1.37)**
NONINTEXP/NONINTINC 1.92 1.32 1.28 1.73 1.38 2.00 4.58
(1.49) (1.01) (1.00) (1.57) (1.39) (1.88) (2.38)*
Return on equity (%) 17.43 29.51 24.24** 20.75 12.83*** 18.60 4.23**




This table summarizes descriptive statistics for accounting information used to proxy for CAMEL components according to
the definitions of failures which include mandatory closure, suspension, and distress in Panels A, B and C respectively.
Figures in parentheses below each mean value are median values. Mean and median differences for relevant partitioned
groups are tested using t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test respectively.
 Table 4
CAMEL Rating
Panel A: Mandatory closure
Non- Non- Non-
closed Closed closed Closed closed Closed
All [N=24] [N=27] [N=24] [N=28] [N=24] [N=28]
CAMELEQWEIGHTED 3.41 3.08 3.82*** 3.25 3.68** 2.83 3.64***
(3.00) (3.00) (4.00)*** (3.00) (4.00)** (3.00) (4.00)***
CAMELDICHOTOMIZED 2.48 2.00 2.93*** 2.22 2.74* 1.78 3.00***
(2.50) (2.00) (3.00)*** (2.00) (3.00)* (2.00) (3.00)***
Panel B: Suspension
Non- Non- Non-
suspended Suspended suspended Suspended suspended Suspended
All [N=32] [N=19] [N=32] [N=20] [N=32] [N=20]
CAMELEQWEIGHTED 3.41 3.31 3.75** 3.34 3.70* 3.03 3.65**
(3.00) (3.00) (4.00)** (3.00) (4.00) (3.00) (4.00)**
CAMELDICHOTOMIZED 2.48 2.26 2.89** 2.29 2.84* 2.06 3.05**
(2.50) (2.00) (3.00)* (2.00) (3.00) (2.00) (3.00)**
Panel C: Distress
Non- Non- Non-
distressed Distressed distressed Distressed distressed Distressed
All [N=21] [N=30] [N=21] [N=31] [N=21] [N=31]
CAMELEQWEIGHTED 3.41 3.00 3.81*** 3.19 3.68** 2.76 3.61***
(3.00) (3.00) (4.00)*** (3.00) (4.00)** (3.00) (4.00)***
CAMELDICHOTOMIZED 2.48 1.80 2.97*** 2.15 2.73* 1.55 3.03***
(2.50) (2.00) (3.00)*** (2.00) (3.00)* (2.00) (3.00)***
1994 1995 1996
1994 1995 1996
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for constructed CAMEL ratings according to the definitions of failures which include
mandatory closure, suspension, and distress in Panels A, B and C respectively. CAMELEQWEIGHTED is the score that is assigned
to any of 5 ranges - 0-30 with score 5, 30-50 with score 4, 50-70 with score 3, 70-90 with score 2, and 90-100 with score 1 - based on
an equally weighted average of percentile scores of all CAMEL components. CAMELDICHOTOMIZING is the sum of the values
assigned to five dummy variables that are transformed based on the percentile scores of corresponding CAMEL components. The
dummy variable takes value one if the percentile score of a CAMEL component is below 50 percent. The variable has value ranging
from 0 to 5. Figures in parentheses below each mean value are median values. Mean and median differences for relevant partitioned
















Cost of deposit insurance
Non- Non- Non-
ALL closed Closed suspended Suspended distressed Distressed
[N=52] [N=24] [N=28] [N=32] [N=20] [N=21] [N=31]
Contingent liability (basis points) 3.29 1.77 4.59*** 2.21 5.01** 1.95 4.20**
(2.06) (0.97) (3.45)*** (1.09) (3.48)** (1.03) (3.28)**
Book value of total assets  123,446  89,248 32,666***  78,394 26,890***  83,479 37,670**
     (Millions of Baht) (42,996) (74,186) (31,083)*** (65,635) (25,458)*** (65,635) (33,226)*
Estimated market value of  128,043  224,294 45,543***  186,988 33,731**  233,085 56,886***
     total assets (Millions of Baht) (42,719) (79,237) (30,534)*** (70,850) (24,679)*** (73,002) (33,092)*
Estimated asset return  4.89 5.16 4.66 5.38 4.11* 5.47 4.50
     volatility (%) (4.21) (4.26) (4.20) (4.61) (3.65)** (4.34) (4.16)
Estimated equity return 44.20 39.98 47.82*** 41.36 48.75*** 40.29 46.85***
     volatility (%) (45.50) (40.71) (47.00)*** (41.35) (48.00)*** (41.00) (46.00)***
Bank debts/Market value 88.69 86.73 90.36*** 86.81 91.69*** 86.01 90.50***
     of total assets (%) (89.11) (87.30) (90.69)** (87.30) (92.87)*** (87.29) (90.94)***
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Mandatory closure Suspension Distress
This table reports the estimated costs of deposit insurance (contingent liablity) estimated using the method of Ronn and Verma
(1986) and related components. Each variable is presented according to the definitions of failures which include mandatory closure,
suspension, and distress. Figures in parentheses below each mean value are median values. Mean and median differences for





















Ownership and internal corporate control
Non- Non- Non-
ALL closed Closed suspended Suspended distressed Distressed
[N=52] [N=24] [N=28] [N=32] [N=20] [N=21] [N=31]
Cash flow rights 21.68 25.73 18.20* 24.46 17.21* 26.55 18.37**
(19.64) (23.70) (16.78)* (21.97) (11.22)* (24.72) (17.93)*
Control rights 28.74 32.38 25.63* 31.62 24.14* 33.64 25.43**
(29.51) (31.56) (24.44) (31.56) (23.22)* (32.61) (24.75)*
FAMINBD 0.63 0.58 0.68 0.56 0.75 0.52 0.71
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
DUALITY 0.29 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.33 0.26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Mandatory closure Suspension Distress
This table reports the summary of ownership concentration of the largest shareholder, the presence of the largest individual
shareholder on the board, and the presence of Chairman-CEO duality for the year ending 1996. Control right is the aggregation of
direct ownership and indirect ownership which is the sum of the weakest links in the chain of voting rights. Cash flow right is the
aggregation of direct ownership and the sum of the products of all ownership stakes along the chain of control. FAMINBD is a
dummy variable which takes the value one if the largest sharehol d e rf r o mf a m i l yg r o u pi so nt h eb o a r do fd i r e c t o r sa n dz e r o
otherwise. DUALITY is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the chairman of the board also serves the chief executive
officer and zero otherwise. Figures in parentheses below each mean value are median values. Mean and median differences for






















Panel A: By owner identity No. % 
Family/A group of related faimilies 35 67.31
Crown property bureau 5 9.62
Government agency 9 17.31
Foreign investors 3 5.77
Total 52 100.00
Panel B: By concentration level
No. % No. %
0 - 5% 0 0.00 5 9.62
5 - 10% 3 5.77 10 19.23
10 - 25% 19 36.54 19 36.54
25 - 50% 25 48.08 15 28.85
50 - 75% 5 9.62 3 5.77
75 - 100% 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 52 100.00 52 100.00
Control rights Cash flow rights
This table presents the frequency of control by the types of the largest shareholders and by the levels of concentration
for all sample banks and finance companies in 1996.
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